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Abstract—Device coordination in open spectrum systems is a
challenging problem, particularly since users experience varying
spectrum availability over time and location. In this paper, we
propose a game theoretical approach that allows cognitive radio
pairs, namely the primary user (PU) and the secondary user (SU),
to update their transmission powers and frequencies simultane-
ously. Specifically, we address a Stackelberg game model in which
individual users attempt to hierarchically access to the wireless
spectrum while maximizing their energy efficiency. A thorough
analysis of the existence, uniqueness and characterization of
the Stackelberg equilibrium is conducted. In particular, we
show that a spectrum coordination naturally occurs when both
actors in the system decide sequentially about their powers
and their transmitting carriers. As a result, spectrum sensing
in such a situation turns out to be a simple detection of the
presence/absence of a transmission on each sub-band. We also
show that when users experience very different channel gains
on their two carriers, they may choose to transmit on the same
carrier at the Stackelberg equilibrium as this contributes enough
energy efficiency to outweigh the interference degradation caused
by the mutual transmission. Then, we provide an algorithmic
analysis on how the PU and the SU can reach such a spectrum
coordination using an appropriate learning process. We validate
our results through extensive simulations and compare the
proposed algorithm to some typical scenarios including the non-
cooperative case in [1] and the throughput-based-utility systems.
Typically, it is shown that the proposed Stackelberg decision
approach optimizes the energy efficiency while still maximizing
the throughput at the equilibrium.
Index Terms—Cognitive Radio Networks; Multi-carrier sys-
tems; Energy Efficiency; Spectrum Coordination; Game Theory;
Learning; Sensing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive radio technology has been proposed first to in-
crease the throughput of the mobiles for the next generation
of wireless technologies [2]. This enhancement is possible
with an efficient use of the wireless spectrum and specifically
spectrum holes. Indeed, PUs that have a specific and licensed
access to the spectrum let part of the spectrum unused in
different time and geographic location. Many works have
been done for optimizing the behavior of SUs in cognitive
radio networks (CRNs), see [3] for a survey. However, most
of previous works are focused on spectrum sharing [4] or
CRN and interference avoidance [5]. Consequently, the energy
efficiency aspect in this setting was largely ignored. Green
communications are attracting growing attention due to various
Copyright (c) 2013 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted.
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economical and environmental reasons. This has led research
community to focus more to reduce energy consumption by
introducing enhanced networking technologies [6], [7]. Moti-
vated by the limited battery life of mobile terminals in spite
of the transmission rate, green networking have spurred great
interest and excitement these recent years. In the literature,
energy efficient power control game has been first proposed
by Goodman et al. in [8] for flat fading channels and re-used
by [1] for multi-carrier code-division multiple access (CDMA)
systems and [9] for relay-assisted DS/CDMA. Most of these
works do not consider the cognitive radio technology and
therefore the capabilities of the secondary users.
In CRN, interference management is very important since
the interference due to spectrum-sharing can significantly
degrade the overall performance. In the existing work, various
resource allocation methods are proposed to either improve
energy efficiency or alleviate interference. However, very little
research has addressed their joint interaction. In [10], the
authors considered that primary and secondary users’ signals
coexist in the same frequency band, and the transmit powers
of the SUs are constrained so that the interference from
the whole secondary network to each PU does not exceed
a prescribed threshold. They formulate the problem using a
non-cooperative power control game and proved the existence
of a unique Nash equilibrium (NE). [11] provides an energy
efficient game perspective to the problem of contention-based
synchronization in orthogonal frequency-division multiple ac-
cess (OFDMA) communication systems. Each user trades off
its available resources so as to selfishly maximize its own
revenue (in terms of probability of correct detection) while
saving as much energy as possible and satisfying quality-of-
service (QoS) requirements (in terms of probability of false
alarm and timing estimation accuracy). In [12], the authors
study the gradual removal problem in energy efficient wireless
networks. That is, any transmitting user whose required trans-
mit power for reaching its target-SIR exceeds its maximum
power is temporarily removed, but resumes its transmission
if its required transmit power goes below a given threshold
obtained in a distributed manner. Thus all transmitting users
reach their target rate consuming the minimum aggregate
transmit power.
We consider in this paper a hierarchical (Stackelberg) game
model of a CRN in which the PU is the leader and the
SU is the follower of the game. It is noteworthy that in
our paper we consider the spectrum underlay concept in
which the PU experiences interference from the SU. Most
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2of the current work has been focusing on the spectrum
sharing between cognitive radio pairs, where cognitive radio
nodes dynamically detect spectrum holes of primary spectrum
users and opportunistically utilize them in frequency and time
[3]. We formally prove that the hierarchical structure of the
game induces a spectrum coordination between the different
components of the network in such a way that they transmit
on distinct carriers. This coordination property across the
multiple interfering devices is particularly appealing not only
from an implementation perspective, but also due to its low
complexity, smaller overhead, and ability for radio resource
management (see as an example [13] for open spectrum ad-
hoc networks, [14] for multi-cell MIMO systems and [15] for
cellular downlink networks).
There are many motivations for studying wireless networks
with hierarchical structures, but the most important ones are
to improve the network efficiency and modeling aspect. The
Stackelberg game has been firstly proposed in economic prob-
lem and also in biology for modeling optimal behaviors against
nature [16]. It is in fact a mechanism for wireless networks
in which some wireless nodes have the priority to access
the medium whereas some other nodes are equipped with
cognitive sensors like in CRN (see [17] which is one of the first
reference which addressed a multi-leader and multi-follower
game theoretic model for CR spectrum sharing networks). This
is also a natural setting for heterogeneous wireless networks
due to the absence of coordination among the small cells
and between small cells and macro cells [18], [19]. At the
core lies the idea that the utility of the leader obtained at the
Stackelberg equilibrium is higher than his utility obtained at
the NE when the two users play simultaneously. This is due to
the Stackelberg mechanism in which the leader anticipates the
follower’s action. It has been proved in [20] that this result is
also true for the follower. The goal is then to find a Stackelberg
equilibrium in this two-step game [21].
The original contributions of this paper are threefold:
• Introducing hierarchy concept in power control game for
energy efficient multi-carrier systems,
• Characterizing completely and analytically the Stackel-
berg equilibrium and compare the results obtained in the
proposed hierarchical game with those obtained in the
non-cooperative game in [1],
• Our main result is that we always obtain an equilibrium
(contrary to the work addressed in [1]) where, for the
most general cases, the two users transmit on distinct
carriers delivering a binary channel assignment.
The organization of the paper is the following. First, we
introduce in Section II the CRN context and the different
decision makers of the system. In Section III, we define the
energy efficiency framework which is used throughout the pa-
per and present the game theoretic model in Section IV. Next,
in Section V, we characterize the Stackelberg equilibrium by
providing a thorough analysis on the existence and uniqueness
of such an equilibrium. Having these results, we then address
the important property of spectrum coordination in Section
VI. Section VII provides an analysis of the implementation
issues including a learning algorithm that ensures convergence
to the Stackelberg equilibrium in VII-A and the sensing issue
in VII-B. Section VIII illustrates some numerical results and
Section IX concludes the paper.
II. THE COGNITIVE RADIO SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a network composed of a PU (or leader –
indexed by 1), having the priority to access the medium, and a
SU (or follower – indexed by 2) that accesses the medium after
observing the action of the PU subject to mutual interference.
We assume slotted transmissions (over carriers) for both the
PU and the SU. The equivalent baseband signal received by
the base station can be written as
yk = h1kx1k + h2kx2k + zk, for k = 1, 2 (1)
where hnk stands for the block fading process of user n on
the sub-band k, xnk is the signal transmitted by user n on
the sub-band k and zk is the additive Gaussian noise at the
kth sub-band. We denote by gnk = |hnk|2 the fading channel
gain which is assumed to stay constant over each block fading
length (i.e., coherent communication). We statistically model
the channel gains gn to be i.i.d. distributed over the Rayleigh
fading coefficients. The signal transmitted xnk can be further
written as xnk =
√
pnksnk where pnk and snk are the transmit
power and data of user n. We thus have E
{|xnk|2} = pnk.
The additive Gaussian noise zk at the receiver is i.i.d. circularly
symmetric and zk ∼ CN (0, σ2) for k = 1, 2. For any user
n ∈ {1, 2} the received signal-to-noise plus interference ratio
(SINR) over carrier k is expressed as
γnk =
gnkpnk
σ2 +
2∑
m=1
m 6=n
gmkpmk
:= pnkĥnk. (2)
In the remainder, we will define the ratio between the SINR
γnk and the transmission power pnk by the effective channel
gain ĥnk. It follows from the above SINR expression that
the strategy chosen by a user (i.e., the power vector pn =
(pn1, pn2)) may affect the performance of the other user in
the network through multiple-access interference reflected by
the effective channel gain.
III. NETWORK ENERGY EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
Our system model is based on the seminal paper [8] that
defines the energy efficiency framework. In order to formulate
the power control problem as a game, we first need to define
a utility function suitable for data applications. Increasing
the transmit power clearly favors the packet success rate and
therefore the throughput. However, as the packet success rate
tends to one, further increasing the power can lead to marginal
gains in terms of throughput regarding the amount of extra
power used. The following utility function allows one to
measure the corresponding trade-off between the transmission
benefit (total throughput over both carriers) and cost (total
3power over both carriers)1:
un(p1,p2) =
Rn · (f(γn1) + f(γn2))
pn1 + pn2
(3)
where Rn is the transmission rate of user n and f(·) is
an increasing, continuous and S-shaped efficiency function
which measures the packet success rate. A more detailed
discussion of the efficiency function can be found in [22].
The utility function un that has units of bits per joule perfectly
captures the trade-off between throughput and battery life and
is particularly suitable for applications where energy efficiency
is crucial such as sensors and mobiles terminals.
IV. THE GAME THEORETIC FRAMEWORK
A. The non-cooperative game problem
An important solution concept of the game under consid-
eration is the NE [23], which is a fundamental concept in
non-cooperative strategic games. It is a vector of strategies
(or actions in our case) pNE = {p1NE ,p2NE}, one for
each player, such that no player has incentive to unilaterally
deviate, i.e., un(pnNE ,pNE−n ) ≥ un(pn,pNE−n ) for all action
pn 6= pnNE , where the −n subscript on vector p stands for
”except user n”. In [8], authors showed that, under certain
conditions, the NE of the game with utility (3) exists.
B. The hierarchical game formulation
In this work, we consider a Stackelberg game framework in
which the PU decides first his power control vector p1 and
based on this, the SU will adapt his power control vector p2.
Definition 1. (Stackelberg equilibrium): A vector of actions
p˜ = (p˜1, p˜2) = (p˜11, p˜12, p˜21, p˜22) is called Stackelberg
equilibrium (SE) if and only if:
p˜1 = arg max
p1
u1(p1,p2(p1)),
where
∀p1, p2(p1) = arg max
p2
u2(p1,p2),
and p˜2 = p2(p˜1).
A SE can be determined using a bi-level approach [21].
Given the action of the PU, we compute the best-response
function of the SU (the function p2(·)), i.e., the action of the
SU which maximizes his utility given the action of the PU.
This best-response function is characterized by using a result
from [1] which depends on the PU’s power control on carrier
k through the following expression:
∀k ∈ {1, 2}, ĥ2k(p1k) = γ2k
p2k
=
g2k
σ2 + g1kp1k
.
1Notice that although this is not a restriction of the proposed analysis and
for the sake of simplicity in the notations, we do not consider the circuit
power needed to operate user n in the definition of the consumed power in
the denominator of Eq. (3).
V. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE STACKELBERG
EQUILIBRIUM
In order to determine the SE, a standard approach is
to consider a backward induction technique. Then, we first
determine the best-response function of the SU depending
on the action of the PU. This result comes directly from
Proposition 1 of [1]. For making this paper sufficiently self-
contained, we review here the latter proposition.
A. The secondary user’s power control vector
Proposition 1. (Given in [1])
Given the power control vector p1 of the PU, the best-
response function of the SU is given by
p2k(p1) =

γ∗(σ2 + g1kp1k)
g2k
, for k = L2(p1),
0, for all k 6= L2(p1)
(4)
with L2(p1) = arg max
k
ĥ2k(p1k) and γ∗ is the unique
(positive) solution of the first order equation
x f ′(x) = f(x). (5)
Equation (5) has a unique solution if the efficiency function
f(·) is sigmoidal [24], and we will use this assumption
throughout our paper.
Proposition 1 claims that there are two regions depending
on the PU’s power control which yields different best-response
functions for the SU. Below, we define the two regions:
A =
{
(p11, p12)|ĥ22 ≥ ĥ21
}
=
{
(p11, p12)|p12 ≤ p11 g11g22
g12g21
+ σ2
(g22 − g21)
g12g21
}
(6)
and
B =
{
(p11, p12)|ĥ22 < ĥ21
}
=
{
(p11, p12)|p12 > p11 g11g22
g12g21
+ σ2
(g22 − g21)
g12g21
}
.(7)
B. The primary user’s power control vector
So far, we have seen that the best-response function of the
SU is to use only one carrier, the one with the best effective
channel gain. Let us now study the optimal power control for
the PU knowing the best-response function of the SU. The
following proposition, which is our first main result, gives the
existence and uniqueness of the optimal power control of the
PU at the SE knowing the best-response function of the SU.
Notice that uniqueness of the SE is a desirable property for a
Stackelberg game. If there exists exactly one equilibrium, we
can predict the equilibrium strategy of the players and resulting
performance of the system.
Proposition 2. (First main result) Existence and uniqueness
of the PU’s power control at the SE
There exists a unique power control vector p˜1 = (p˜11p˜12) for
4the PU which maximizes his energy efficiency over Region A.
It is defined by:
p˜12 = 0, and p˜11 =

σ2γ∗
g11
, if
g22
g21
≥ 1
1 + γ∗
,
σ2(g21 − g22)
g11g22
, otherwise.
There exists a unique power control vector p˜1 = (p˜11, p˜12)
for the PU which maximizes his energy efficiency over Region
B. It is defined by:
p˜11 = 0 and p˜12 =

σ2γ∗
g12
, if
g22
g21
≤ 1 + γ∗,
σ2(g22 − g21)
g12g21
, otherwise.
For the clarity of the exposition, this proposition is proven
in Appendix A.
This result combined with the result of Prop. 1 yields the
existence of a SE.
Corollary 1. At the Stackelberg equilibrium, when the channel
gains of the SU satisfy
1
1 + γ∗
≤ g21
g22
≤ 1 + γ∗, (8)
the power control vector p˜1 which maximizes the PU’s utility
is unique and is given by
p˜1k =

σ2γ∗
g1k
, for k = k˜,
0, for all k 6= k˜,
(9)
where k˜ denotes the ”best” carrier of the PU, i.e., k˜ =
arg max
k
g1k.
Proof: The proof makes use of results from Prop. 2 for
the PU’s power control in Region A and B. We have that the
utility of the PU within Region A is maximized when p12 = 0,
yielding
max
p11,p12
uA1 (p11, p12) = max
p11
uA1 (p11, 0) = max
p11
R1f(
g11p11
σ2 )
p11
(10)
which implies that the maximum utility over RegionA is given
by u˜A1 = u
A
1 (p˜11, 0).
Within Region B, we have that the utility of the PU is
maximized when p11 = 0, yielding
max
p11,p12
uB1 (p11, p12) = max
p12
uB1 (0, p12) = max
p12
R1f(
g12p12
σ2 )
p12
.
(11)
which implies that the maximum utility within Region B is
u˜B1 = u
B
1 (0, p˜12). Combining the above results for Region A
(in Eq. (10)) and Region B (in Eq. (11)), the maximization
problem of the PU’s utility becomes
max
p11,p12
u1(p11, p12) = max(u˜
A
1 , u˜
B
1 ) =
{
u˜A1 , if g11 ≥ g12,
u˜B1 , if g11 < g12
where we use the fact that f is a strictly increasing function.
This completes the proof.
Condition 8 means that a given user experiences approxi-
mately the same channel characteristics over his two carriers.
Note that this is typically the case when the two carriers are
close enough [25]. Corollary 1 says that the utility of PU
is maximized when he transmits only over his best carrier.
Accordingly, we observe that the carrier which doest not
provide enough energy efficiency to outweigh the interference
degradation caused by the SU’s transmission is switched ”off”.
Notice that this result is in contradiction with throughput-
based-utility systems which lead to a water-filling power
control [26] where only a certain number of carriers are
exploited depending on the channel gains.
To resume, Prop. 1 and Prop. 2 suggest that, at the SE, both
the SU and the PU transmit on only one carrier depending on
their channel gains. In the next section, we will show that
hierarchy ”pushes” users towards coordinating their actions in
such a way that they transmit on distinct carriers.
VI. SPECTRUM COORDINATION
A. General result
A necessary and sufficient condition on the SU’s channel
gains such that the best-response function of the SU is to
transmit over a distinct carrier than the PU is given in the
following proposition.
Proposition 3. At the Stackelberg equilibrium, if the PU
transmits over only one carrier, the SU transmits over a
distinct carrier if and only if Condition (8) is satisfied.
The proof of Prop. 3 is given in Appendix B. Prop. 3 claims
that Condition (8) is a necessary and sufficient condition
to obtain spectrum coordination. We will see in the next
proposition that a spectrum coordination can occurs even if
Condition (8) is not satisfied. In this case, the SE is not unique
as the SU obtains the same utility by choosing to transmit
either on a different carrier from the PU (coordination case)
or on the same carrier than the PU (non coordination case).
Proposition 4. (Second main result) Spectrum Coordination
Introducing hierarchy between users in a two-carrier energy
efficient power control game induces a natural coordination
pattern where users have incentive to choose their transmitting
carriers in such a way that they transmit on orthogonal
channels.
Proof: To show this important result, we will determine
the Stackelberg equilibria of the users depending on their
channel gains. As far as the proposed hierarchical model
is concerned, the SE can be computed by considering the
following possibilities:
• (a) If
1
1 + γ∗
≤ g21
g22
≤ 1 + γ∗ (i.e., the SU experiences
approximately the same radio conditions over his two
carriers),
– (i) if
g11
g12
< 1, then p2(0,
σ2γ∗
g12
) = (σ
2γ∗
g21
, 0) because
ĥ22 =
g22
σ2(1+γ∗) and ĥ21 =
g21
σ2 .
The SE is then given by:
(p˜11, p˜12, p˜21, p˜22) =
(
0,
γ∗σ2
g12
,
γ∗σ2
g21
, 0
)
, (12)
5– (ii) otherwise,
g11
g12
≥ 1, then p2(σ
2γ∗
g11
, 0) =
(0, σ
2γ∗
g22
) because ĥ21 = g21σ2(1+γ∗) and ĥ22 =
g22
σ2 .
The SE is then given by: is
(p˜11, p˜12, p˜21, p˜22) =
(
γ∗σ2
g11
, 0, 0,
γ∗σ2
g22
)
. (13)
• (b) If
g21
g22
> 1 + γ∗ (i.e., the SU experiences deep fade
on his second carrier compared to his first carrier),
– (i) if
g11
g12
< 1, then the Stackelberg equilibrium is
(p˜11, p˜12, p˜21, p˜22) =
(
0,
γ∗σ2
g12
,
γ∗σ2
g21
, 0
)
. (14)
– (ii) otherwise,
g11
g12
≥ 1, the power control vector of
the PU at the SE is
(p˜11, p˜12) =

(
σ2(g21 − g22)
g11g22
, 0
)
if (15),(
0, σ
2γ∗
g12
)
otherwise.
where Condition (15) is
g11
g12
≥ f(γ
∗)
γ∗
g21
g22
− 1
f( g21g22 − 1)
. (15)
The SU transmits on the carrier which is left idle by
the PU if Condition (15) is not satisfied. In this case
(p˜21, p˜22) =
(
σ2γ∗
g21
, 0
)
.
If Condition (15) is satisfied, we have the following
best-response function for the SU:
p2(
σ2(g21 − g22)
g11g22
, 0) =
{
(
σ2γ∗
g22
, 0) or (0,
σ2γ∗
g22
)
}
,
because the effective channel gains are equal for
both carriers, i.e., ĥ21 = ĥ22 = g22σ2 . Then the
best-response function is not unique in this case
and the two players can use the same carrier, the
first one here. As the SU plays after observing the
action of the primary user, the SU can decide, for
optimizing spectrum utilization, to transmit over the
carrier left idle by the PU. Moreover, the SU’s power
is inversely proportional to the channel gain over the
second carrier. Then, it is more convenient for him
to transmit over this second carrier.
• (c) If
g21
g22
<
1
1 + γ∗
(i.e., the SU experiences deep fade
on his first carrier compared to his second carrier), we
have the similar results:
– (i) if
g11
g12
≥ 1, then the SE is
(p˜11, p˜12, p˜21, p˜22) =
(
γ∗σ2
g11
, 0, 0,
γ∗σ2
g22
)
. (16)
– (ii) otherwise,
g11
g12
< 1, the power control vector of
the PU at the SE is
(p˜11, p˜12) =

(
0,
σ2(g22 − g21)
g12g21
)
if (17),(
σ2γ∗
g11
, 0
)
otherwise.
where Condition (17) is
g11
g12
<
γ∗
f(γ∗)
f( (g22−g21)g21 )
(g22−g21)
g21
. (17)
The SU transmits on the carrier which is left idle by
the PU if Condition (17) is not satisfied. In this case
(p˜21, p˜22) =
(
0,
σ2γ∗
g22
)
.
If Condition (17) is satisfied, we have the following
best-response function for the SU:
p2(0,
σ2(g22 − g21)
g12g21
) =
{
(0,
σ2γ∗
g21
) or (
σ2γ∗
g21
, 0)
}
,
because the effective channel gains are equal for
both carriers, i.e., ĥ21 = ĥ22 = g21σ2 . Then the best-
response function is not unique in this case and the
two players can use the same carrier, the second one
here. In this particular case, the SU can decide to
transmit over the first carrier in order to optimize
the spectrum utilization. Again, as the SU’s power
is inversely proportional to the channel gain on the
first carrier, it is more convenient for him to transmit
over this first carrier.
Having treated the case of spectrum coordination, let us now
present a particular case (on the fading channel ) where the
two players gain by transmitting on the same carrier at the SE.
B. Extreme Case
In a Stackelberg game, if the leader decides to play a Nash
action, then the follower plays the Nash action too as it is the
best-response function to the Nash action. Then, depending on
the ratio
g11
g12
, it could be interesting for the PU to transmit
over the same channel than the SU. We will show in the
next proposition that this case can appear, essentially when
the target SINR at the SE is very low, i.e., γ∗ < 1 and with
some conditions on the channel gains.
Proposition 5. At the Stackelberg equilibrium, in Region A
(resp. Region B), if γ∗ < 1, both the PU and the SU transmit
on the first (resp. second) carrier if
gn1
gn2
≥ 1
1− γ∗ , (resp.
gn1
gn2
≤ 1− γ∗), for n ∈ {1, 2}.
(18)
The proof of Prop. 5 is given in Appendix C. Prop. 5
claims that the probability of extreme case turns out to be
the probability of no coordination between users. Specifically,
in the extreme case of Region A ( g11g12 ≥ 1/(1 − γ∗)), the
PU decides to transmit on the same carrier (second one here)
as the second carrier is much better that the first one. In the
extreme case of Region B ( g11g12 ≤ 1− γ∗), the channel gain is
very bad on the second carrier with respect to the one on the
first carrier and then both users choose to transmit on the first
carrier. Note that, in this case, the SU and the PU transmit
over the same carrier using an optimal power control given by
the Stackelberg model proposed in [20].
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Fig. 1. The probability of being in the extreme case (or the probability of
no coordination) considering Rayleigh fading channels.
Notice that, in the case of Rayleigh fading channels, the
probability of being in the extreme case is given by:
ψ(γ
∗
) = Pr
{
g11
g12
≥ 1
1− γ∗
}
· Pr
{
g21
g22
≥ 1
1− γ∗
}
+Pr
{
g11
g12
≤ 1− γ∗
}
· Pr
{
g21
g22
≤ 1− γ∗
}
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
y
(1−γ∗)
e
−(x+y)
dxdy
2
+
[∫ ∞
0
∫ (1−γ∗)y
0
e
−(x+y)
dxdy
]2
= 2 ·
(
γ∗ − 1
γ∗ − 2
)2
.
Figure 1 depicts the probability of being in the extreme
case – which is the probability of no coordination – when
γ∗ < 1. It is shown that the probability of being in the extreme
case is always lower than 0.5. As γ∗ increases, the extreme
region shrinks resulting in a decrease of the probability of no
coordination.
A global overview of the occupation of the carriers at the
SE, as function of the ratios
g21
g22
and
g11
g12
is depicted in Figure
2. It is shown the main contributions of the paper, namely
• we have proved the existence and uniqueness of an
equilibrium when a user can observe the action of the
other user before deciding his own action, whatever the
channel gains are. This result is not true in the case when
the two users play a NE (see for instance [1]),
• although we have formulated the problem of energy
efficiency maximization by allowing that a carrier could
be shared by both users, we have obtained a spectrum
coordination pattern in which, to refrain from mutual
interference, users have incentive to choose their carriers
orthogonally (exactly like in OFDMA systems).
VII. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
Although Prop. 1 and Prop. 2 guarantee SE existence, it is
still not clear whether users will be able to calculate this equi-
librium in a decentralized environment where only partial/local
information is available at the mobile terminal. Consequently,
our goal in this section will be to study implementation issues
related to the converge to the equilibrium and its speed along
with the sensing problem. So far, we have assumed that the
channels are static. If the channels fluctuate stochastically over
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[SU,PU]
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Fig. 2. Stackelberg equilibrium regions for the case of two users and two
carriers. The point [SU, PU ] means that the PU transmits over the second
carrier and the SU over the first one.
time, the associated game still admits an equilibrium, but the
learning process is no more deterministic; just the same, by
employing the theory of stochastic approximation, it can be
shown that users still converge to equilibrium [27]. In the next
section, we propose a temporal difference learning algorithm
that ensures convergence to the SE within a limited time.
A. Learning-based approach
The interaction between the PU and the SU provides a
potential incentive for both agents to make decision process
based on their respective perceived payoff. Determining the
equilibrium strategy of both the primary and the secondary
users requires in practice the knowledge of several infor-
mations which can not be observed in a realistic scenario
[28]. We propose, in this section, an on-policy learning-based
algorithm that allow the PU and the SU to determine their
strategies on-the-fly. Machine learning is a powerful technique
where learning is accomplished by real-time interactions with
the environment, and proper utilization of past experience.
In particular, we consider a well-known temporal difference
learning where each user maintains state-value functions as a
lookup tables in order to determine the optimal action in the
current time slot [29]. To cope with the hierarchical decision
process between the PU and the SU, we further set an iteration
scale parameter Niter which traduces how frequent the SU
updates its state-value function and set new values of powers
with respect to the PU. The PU’s state-value function q(g,p)
is given by
q(gt−1,pt−1)← (1− βt)q(gt−1,pt−1) + βt(u1 + κq(gt,pt)),
whereas, the SU’s state-value function Q(g,p) is
Q(gt−1,pt−1)← (1− αt)Q(gt−1,pt−1) + αt(u2 + κQ(gt,pt)),
7where κ is the discount factor, and βt and αt are the learning
rate factors satisfying
∑∞
t=1 βt = ∞ and
∑∞
t=1(βt)
2 < ∞,
respectively
∑∞
t=1 αt =∞ and
∑∞
t=1(αt)
2 <∞.
The pseudo-code for the proposed algorithm is given in
Algorithm 1. Specifically, we consider an effective balancing
between exploration and exploitation. Note that with a
probability  we explore new actions, while we choose the
already established action with a probability 1 − . Indeed,
the trade-off between exploration and exploitation remains a
challenging issue in stochastic learning process.
Algorithm 1: Learning-based Algorithm for Energy
Efficient Cognitive Radio Networks.
Initialize q(g,p) = 0 and Q(g,p) = 0 for all channel
gains and transmit powers;
Initialize R, g1, g2,p1 and p2;
while true do
gprev1 = g1;
pprev1 = p1;
Observe the new channel gains g1 = (g11, g12);
Select transmit power vector p1 = (p11, p12) as
follows p1 = arg maxp’ q(g1,p’) with probability
(1− ), else choose a random transmit power vector;
for n = 1→ Niter do
gprev2 = g2;
pprev2 = p2;
Observe the new channel gains g2 = (g21, g22);
Select transmit power vector p2 = (p21, p22) as
follows p2 = arg maxp’ Q(g2,p’) with probability
(1− ), else choose a random power vector;
Use the transmit power vector p = (p1, p2) and
observe the reward u2, and u1 given by Eq. (3);
Q(gprev,pprev)←
(1− αt)Q(gprev,pprev) + αt(u2 + κQ(g2,p2));
R = R+ u1;
end
q(gprev,pprev)←
(1− βt)q(gprev,pprev) + βt(R+ κq(g1,p1));
R = 0;
end
The following proposition proves that the learning-based
algorithm for energy efficient cognitive radio networks con-
verges to the optimal policy.
Proposition 6. The learning-based algorithm converges w.p.1
to the optimal Q-function.
The proof of Prop. 6 is given in Appendix D. The learning
rate time is addressed in the following proposition.
Proposition 7. Let QT and qT be the value of the learning-
based algorithm for the SU and the PU respectively. Then, we
have max{||QT − Q∗||, ||qT − q∗||} ≤  with probability at
least 1− δ, given that
T = Ω
(
Niter · (L+ Φ · L+ 1)
1
β
·ln(Vmax

) · V
2
max ln(
|S||A|Vmax
δβΦ
)
(Φβ)2
)
(19)
where β = (1− κ)/2, Vmax = Rmax1−κ , Rmax is the maximum
reward obtained, and |S| and |A| are the number of possible
states and strategies respectively. For a sequence of state-
action pairs let the covering time, denoted by L, be an
upper bound on the number of state-action pairs starting
from any pair, until all state-action appear in the sequence.
Indeed, the convergence speed of the proposed algorithm
depends on the iteration scale parameter Niter. The notation
T = Ω(Ψ) implies that there are constants c1 and c2 such
that T ≥ c1f lnc2(Ψ).
The proof of Prop. 7 is given in Appendix E.
B. Spectrum Sensing
In the current Stackelberg model, Proposition 4 claims that
the SU transmits over a certain frequency carrier in order to
reach γ∗ only when the PU does not. This enables public
access to the new spectral ranges without sacrificing the
transmission quality of the actual license owners. Typically, the
PU comes first in the system, estimates his channel gains g1k
over his two carriers and adapts his transmit power using Prop.
2. The SU comes later in the system, estimates his channel
links g2k over his two carriers and chooses his transmit power
using Prop. 1. Such an assumption could be further justified by
the fact that in an asynchronous context, the probability that
two users decide to transmit at the same moment is negligible
as the number of users is limited. Thus, within this setting,
the PU is assumed to be oblivious to the presence of the SU.
The PU communicates with his BS while the SU listens to the
wireless channel. The SU has only to reliably detect the carrier
used by the PU and not the PU’s transmit power as it is the
case in the single carrier context in [20]). Many well-known
techniques were developed in order to detect the holes in the
spectrum band (energy detection [30], feature detection [31],
etc.).
VIII. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATION
In this section, we present a comprehensive Matlab-based
simulation of the CRN described in the previous sections.
We consider the energy efficiency function proposed in most
papers dealing with power control games that is f(x) =
(1 − e−x)M , where M = 100 is the block length in bits.
This results on γ∗ = 6.4 (= 8.1 dB). SNR = 1/σ2 and the
rate Rn = 1 Mbps for n = {1, 2}.
A. Energy Efficiency as a function of the SNR
This section is devoted to performance comparison of
the proposed Stackelberg scheme with respect to traditional
schemes. As far as sum energy efficiency comparison is
concerned, this can be conducted by considering the four
following schemes:
• the Stackelberg model: the one proposed in this paper,
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• the Nash model: each user chooses his power level
according to [1],
• the best channel model: each user chooses to transmit on
his ”best” channel (i.e., the one with the best channel
gain) without sensing,
• the best channel with sensing: the PU chooses the ”best”
channel to transmit on. The SU senses the spectrum and
transmits on the vacant sub-band. Here we assume perfect
sensing of the idle sub-band by the SU.
In Figure 3, we plot the energy efficiency at equilibrium
as function of the SNR. Interestingly, we see that the energy
efficiency of the PU at the SE performs the same than in
the sensing scenario till 12 dB, while the energy efficiency
of the SU at the SE is always the same than in the scheme
where sensing is done by the SU. Moreover, the Stackelberg
model outperforms all the other strategies. This is due to the
Stackelberg mechanism in which the PU anticipates the SU’s
action. In particular, we found out that the PU achieves an
energy efficiency gain up to 80% with respect to the Nash
strategy at 12 dB. As expected, results in Figure 3 also show
that the energy efficiency for the SU at SE is less than the one
obtained at NE. This is due to the fact that in Nash model,
the PU does not anticipate the SU’s action. Notice that, as
the SNR decreases, all configurations tend towards having the
same (zero) energy efficiency. This can be justified by the fact
that, at low SNR regime, whatever the power control strategy
each user chooses, the signal is overwhelmed by the noise.
Figure 4 depicts the throughput at the equilibrium. We
observe approximately the same observations than in Figure 3.
Of particular interest is the fact that the PU still outperforms all
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the other strategies till SNR = 15 dB whereas the throughput
of the SU at the SE is still less than the one obtained at the
Nash equilibrium. That is, the proposed Stackelberg scheme
achieves a flexible and desirable trade-off between energy
efficiency and throughput maximization.
B. Learning the Equilibria
To proceed further with the analysis, we resort to simulate
how the PU and the SU users converge to the equilibria
according to Algorithm 1 presented in Section VII-A. The
noise variance is σ2 = 0.1 which corresponds to a SNR = 10
dB. We consider an iteration scale Niter = 10, which means
that the SU runs 10 iterations for 1 iteration of the PU.
1) Static Channels: In Figures 5 and 6, we consider static
channel gains g11 = 0.4, g12 = 0.3, g21 = 0.6 and g22 = 0.5.
We observe from Figure 5 that the optimal power control
decision of the PU is to transmit on the first carrier whereas
the SU chooses to transmit on the second carrier as claimed
by Prop. 4. Indeed, we have g11g12 ' 1.3 ≥ 1 and
g21
g22
= 1.2
which is in the interval [ 11+γ∗ , 1 + γ
∗]. This means that
the SE is given by Prop. 4-a-ii yielding the following SE:
(p˜11, p˜12, p˜21, p˜22) ' (1.1, 0, 0, 0.9) .
In Figure 7 and 8, we change the second carrier’s PU
channel gain to g11 = 0.2 and the second carrier’s SU channel
gain to g21 = 4. The SE changes accordingly. In fact, we have
that g11g12 ' 0.6 < 1 and
g21
g22
> 1+γ∗ which corresponds to the
case (b-i) of Prop. 4 where the PU decides to transmit on the
second carrier and the SU transmit on the first carrier yielding
the following SE: (p˜11, p˜12, p˜21, p˜22) ' (0, 0.9, 1, 0) .
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In Figure 6 and 8, we look at the energy efficiency of the
PU and the SU. In general case, the PU outperforms the SU
since the PU anticipates the SU’s action (see Fig. 6). However,
it is illustrated in Fig. 8 that, although he plays first, the PU
performs worse that the SU at the equilibrium as the best SU’s
carrier (g21 = 4) is much better than the PU’s best carrier
(g12 = 0.3).
2) Fading Channels: In Figure 9, we plot the energy
efficiency of the PU and the SU at the NE proposed in [1]
depending on time. It is clear that both the PU and the SU
converge to the same energy efficiency since the Nash game
is a one-shot game. We also observe that both the PU and
the SU converge to exactly the same energy efficiency of 1.6
Mbit/Joule than the one obtained in Figure 3 at SNR = 10
dB. Next, we plot in Figure 10, the convergence of the energy
efficiency at the SE for both the PU and the SU. Again
we observe that the PU and the SU converge to the same
energy efficiency of 1.9 Mbit/Joule and of 1.1 Mbit/Joule
respectively obtained in Figure 3 at SNR = 10 dB. Moreover,
as expected, that the energy efficiency at the SE of the PU
is higher than the energy efficiency of the SU. Note that the
variance of energy efficiency in Figures 9 and 10 is due to the
fact that the fading channel states of the PU g1 and the SU g2
vary every time slot. Though, the algorithm still converges to
the equilibrium of an averaged game whose payoff functions
correspond to the users’ achievable ergodic rates.
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IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a hierarchical concept in a
power control game for energy efficient multi-carrier cognitive
radio systems. We have firstly completely and analytically
characterized the Stackelberg equilibrium of such a game.
Interestingly, we have shown that, although we have consid-
ered that each user is prone to interference from the other
transmitter on the same carrier, for the vast majority of cases,
there exists a natural coordination pattern where the PU and
the SU have incentive to choose their transmitting carriers
orthogonally (like in OFDMA systems). The proposed system
goes toward the vision of a fully coordinated cognitive radio
multi-carrier network, whereby transmit powers are coordi-
nated across the users. Then, we have compared the users’
energy efficiency of the proposed hierarchal game with those
obtained in a standard non-cooperative setting. In addition to
allowing coordination of the spectrum usage, the proposed
power control game provides additional functionalities that can
be used in energy efficient CRN. In particular, the proposed
Stackelberg scheme achieves a flexible and desirable trade-off
between energy efficiency and throughput maximization. For
implementation purposes, the SU has only to reliably sense the
spectral environment (and not the PU’s transmit power as it is
the case in the single carrier context in [20]) and then decides
to transmit only on the best carrier left idle by the PU. Finally,
with extensive measurement-driven simulations we show that
the proposed game model converges to the desired equilibria in
a small number of steps, and hence are amenable to practical
implementation.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Prop. 2: Existence and uniqueness of the PU’s
power control at the SE
Proof: Given Proposition 1, we have that the power
control vector of the SU in Region A and B are given,
respectively, by
pA2 (p12) = (0,
γ∗(σ2 + g12p12)
g22
)
and
pB2 (p11) = (
γ∗(σ2 + g11p11)
g21
, 0).
Based on the above equations, we can compute the explicit
expression of the PU’s SINR on each carrier for both regions,
namely
γ11 =

g11p11
σ2
, in Region A,
g11p11
σ2(1 + γ∗) + γ∗g11p11
, in Region B
γ12 =

g12p12
σ2(1 + γ∗) + γ∗g12p12
, in Region A,
g12p12
σ2
, in Region B
It follows that the utility function of the PU given by Equation
(3) for Region A can be expressed as
uA1 (p11, p12) =
R1f(γ11) +R1f(γ12)
p11 + p12
,
=
R1f(
g11p11
σ2 ) +R1f(
g12p12
σ2(1+γ∗)+γ∗g12p12
)
p11 + p12
Similarly, in Region B, the PU’s utility function is
uB1 (p11, p12) =
R1f(
g11p11
σ2(1+γ∗)+γ∗g11p11
) +R1f(
g12p12
σ2 )
p11 + p12
Without loss of generality, the analysis is given only for
Region A. Similar approach can be adopted for Region B.
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We first derive the utility of the PU uA1 (p11, p12) w.r.t p11.
We obtain
∂uA1 (p11, p12)
∂p11
= R1·
f ′(γ11) · g11σ2 · (p11 + p12)− [f(γ11) + f(γ12)]
(p11 + p12)2
Now, let us compute the derivative of the PU’s utility uA1
on the Region A w.r.t p12. We have
∂uA1 (p11, p12)
∂p12
= R1·
f ′(γ12) · ∂γ12∂p12 · (p11 + p12)− [f(γ11) + f(γ12)]
(p11 + p12)2
where
∂γ12
∂p12
=
g12(σ
2 + γ∗(σ2 + p12g12))− g12p12γ∗g12
[σ2 + γ∗(σ2 + p12g12)]
2 .
Knowing that σ2+p12g22 =
σ2(1 + γ12)
1− γ∗γ12 and after some sim-
ple simplifications, we obtain that
∂γ12
∂p12
=
g12(1− γ12γ∗)2
σ2(1 + γ∗)
.
We shall now look for a couple (p11, p12) such that
∂uA1
∂p11
(p11, p12) =
∂uA1
∂p12
(p11, p12) = 0. It follows from
the above results that a couple (p11, p12) is solution of the
following system
(S) :

f ′(γ11)
g11
σ2
(p11 + p12) = f(γ11) + f(γ12)
f ′(γ12)
g12(1− γ12γ∗)2
σ2(1 + γ∗)
(p11 + p12) = f(γ11) + f(γ12)
with γ11 =
g11p11
σ2
and γ12 =
g12p12
σ2(1 + γ∗) + γ∗g12p12
.
The solutions of the above system are given by
p11 =
σ2γ11
g11
(20)
and
p12 =
σ2
g12
γ12(1 + γ
∗)
(1− γ∗γ12) . (21)
In Region A, Eq. (6) yields to the following relation
between the powers of the PU:
p12 ≤ p11 g11g22
g12g21
+ σ2
(g22 − g21)
g12g21
(22)
which means that for all p11 > 0, the PU’s power on the sec-
ond carrier p12 is in the interval
[
0, p11
g11g22
g12g21
+ σ2 (g22−g21)g12g21
]
.
Therefore, our problem boils down to show that, for a fixed
p11, the partial derivative of uA1 (p11, p12) w.r.t. p12 in the
neighboring of zero is a strictly decreasing function. The limit
of the partial derivative of uA1 (p11, p12) when p12 tends to zero
is given by
∀p11 > 0, lim
p12→0+
∂uA1 (p11, p12)
∂p12
=
−R1f( g11p11σ2 )
(p11)2
< 0,
where we used from [24] the fact that f(0) = f ′(0) = 0
yielding that p˜12 = 0 in Region A. So far, we have proved
that maximizing the utility of the PU in Region A implies
maximizing this utility function by considering that p12 = 0.
Then, Condition (22) becomes
p11 ≥ σ
2(g21 − g22)
g11g22
:= p̂11.
On the other hand, we know that the function u1(p11, 0) is
maximized for p˜11 = σ
2γ∗
g11
. It follows that, if σ
2γ∗
g11
≥ p̂11
(i.e., g22g21 ≥ 11+γ∗ ), then the utility of the PU in Region A
is maximized when p˜11 = σ
2γ∗
g11
and p˜12 = 0. Otherwise, if
σ2γ∗
g11
< p̂11, the utility of the PU in Region A is maximized
when p˜11 = p̂11 and p˜12 = 0.
In Region B, the same methodology is adopted by replacing
p11 = 0 in Eq. (7). We end up with the condition below
p12 ≥ σ
2(g22 − g21)
g12g21
:= p̂12.
Moreover, we know that the function u1(0, p12) is maximized
for p˜12 = σ
2γ∗
g12
. It follows that, if σ
2γ∗
g12
≥ p̂12 (i.e., g22g21 ≤
1+γ∗), then the utility of the PU over Region B is maximized
when p˜12 = σ
2γ∗
g12
and p˜11 = 0. Otherwise, if σ
2γ∗
g12
> p̂12, the
utility of the PU over Region B is maximized when p˜12 = p̂12
and p˜11 = 0.
B. Proof of Proposition 3
Proof: Assume that the PU transmits over one carrier, say
carrier i.
• If the SU does not transmit on the carrier i, i.e., L2(p1) =
j 6= i. Then, we have that p1i = σ
2γ∗
g1i
yielding that
ĥ2j =
g2j
σ2
> ĥ2i =
g2i
σ2(1 + γ∗)
which is equivalent to
g2j
g2i
>
1
1 + γ∗
,
Then, we have proved that Condition (8) is sufficient.
• If Condition (8) is satisfied it means that there exists a
carrier j such that g2j > g2i(1+γ∗) . Then, we assume that
the SU transmits over i, which means that
ĥ2i > ĥ2j =
g2j
σ2
.
Suppose that the two players transmit over channel i and
the power used by the PU at the SE is higher compared
to the case when a user is alone on a carrier [20]. Then,
the power p1i used by the PU is higher than σ
2γ∗
g1i
. This
implies that the effective carrier gain of the SU on the
carrier i is:
ĥ2i =
g2i
σ2 + g1ip1i
<
g2i
σ2(1 + γ∗)
<
g2j
σ2
= ĥ2j .
But this is in contradiction with the assumption that the
SU transmits over carrier i, then the SU does not transmit
over carrier i (the one chosen by the PU). We have then
proved the sufficient condition.
C. Proof of Prop. 5
Proof: We prove this proposition considering only Region
A as it is the same idea for Region B. It is preferable for the
PU to transmit over the same carrier than the SU, the second
one in this area, if and only if the utility at the SE when the
PU and the SU transmit on the second carrier is higher than
12
the utility of the PU when he is alone to transmit over the first
carrier.
The maximum utility for the PU, in Region A, when he is
alone to transmit over the first carrier is given by:
uNE1 =
R1f(γ
∗)
σ2γ∗
g11.
When both users transmit over the second carrier and the
PU plays the Nash action, i.e., p12 =
σ2γ∗
g12(1− γ∗) , the best-
response function of the SU is to choose the power p22 =
σ2γ∗
g22(1− γ∗) . This NE exists if the target SINR γ
∗ is less
than 1. Then, the PU’s utility at the NE is
uNE1 =
R1f(γ
∗)(1− γ∗)
σ2γ∗
g12.
This result is true if the Nash action of the PU (p11, p12) =
(0, σ
2γ∗
g12(1−γ∗) ) is inside the Region A. This is true if and only
if
σ2γ∗
g12(1− γ∗) ≤
σ2(g22 − g21)
g12g21
,
which is equivalent to
g21
g22
≤ 1− γ∗.
Thus, the PU’s utility at the NE is better than the utility if he
transmits on the second carrier if and only if:
g11
g12
≤ 1− γ∗.
Then, if g11g12 ≤ 1−γ∗ and
g21
g22
≤ 1−γ∗, we have that uNE1 >
uSE1 . But, the utility of the PU at a SE is, by definition, better
or equal than its utility if he plays the Nash action (the best-
response function of the SU if the PU plays the Nash is the
Nash). Then, if g11g12 ≤ 1−γ∗ and
g21
g22
≤ 1−γ∗ the utility of the
PU at the SE when the two players transmit over the second
carrier, is better than the utility of the PU if he transmits alone
on the first carrier.
We have similar analysis with Region B, in which the SU
transmits over the first carrier. Over this region, the two players
transmit over the first carrier if and only if the following
conditions are satisfied:
g11
g12
≥ 1
1− γ∗ , and
g21
g22
≥ 1
1− γ∗ .
D. Proof of Prop. 6
Proof: The proposed algorithm is a two-time scale version
of the well known Q-learning algorithm. Since both the
utilities of the PU and the SU depend on the states and actions
of PU and SU, i.e., g and p, the utility functions u1 and u2
in Eq. (3) are not deterministic, and considered as random
variables instead. In fact, given the state g2 and the action p2
of the SU, the observed reward of the SU depends also on the
state g1 and the action p1 of the PU, which are unknown for
the SU. The Q-learning algorithm for the SU given by
Q(gk−12 ,p
k−1
2 ) ← (1− αk)Q(gk−12 ,pk−12 )
+αk(u2(gk−12 ,p
k−1
2 ) + κQ(g2kp2k)),
converges to the optimal Q∗(g2,p2) value. In fact, since we
have
• the state and action spaces are finite,
•
∑∞
k=1 αk =∞,
∑∞
k=1(αk)
2 <∞ uniformly w.p.1,
• V ar{u2(g2,p2)} is bounded.
We obtain from Theorem 2 of [32] that the Q-learning
algorithm for the SU converges. Similarly, the Q-learning
algorithm for the PU is expressed as
q(gk−11 ,p
k−1
1 ) ← (1− βk)q(gk−11 ,pk−11 )
+βk(u1 + κq(g1k,p1k)),
converges to the optimal q∗(g1,p1) value. This concludes the
proof.
E. Proof of Prop. 7
Proof: Let Qt and qtbe the value of the asynchronous
Q-learning algorithm using linear learning (results for the
polynomial learning rate exists also). Then, we obtain from
Theorem 5 [33] that with probability 1 − δ, for any positive
constant Φ we have max{||Qt − Q∗||, ||qt − q∗|} ≤ , given
that
T = Ω
(
N · (L+ Φ · L+ 1) 1β ·ln(Vmax ) · V
2
max ln(
|S||A|Vmax
δβΦ
)
(Φβ)2
)
(23)
